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IMPLICATIONS OF PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT MODELS FOR
INDEPENDENT AUDITS
Chairman of Session, Douglas R. Carmichael
Marty Gruber has prepared an outline on implications of

portfolio management.

Marty, do you want to start.

Outline Prepared by Martin Gruber

I.

BACKGROUND. There are three theories of general approaches to
theory which make alternative assumptions about the degree of
perfection in security markets.

A.

The Capital Asset Pricing Model (GAPM). Equilibrium
exists in the capital markets—deviations from equi
librium are non-predictable—all investors should hold
the "market portfolio" at all times.

B.

The Single Index Model. Popularly called the Beta model.
If investors have (or believe they have) some forecasting
ability, they should (will) hold a portfolio which is
very widely but less than fully diversified. The risk
in investors’ portfolios that is not market related
approaches zero and so investors should only be concerned
with the sensitivity of their portfolios to market
movements (the Beta coefficient). In this model, the
user is concerned with forecasting the return from each
stock and the Beta for each stock.

C.

Full Variance-Covariance Models. Holders of small
portfolios must be concerned with non-market related
risk as well as market related risk. They must estimate
expected returns, the uncertainty of returns for each
stock (variances) and the co-movements between the
returns on all stocks (correlations).

The CAPM makes horrendous assumptions about investor behavior,
e.g., homogeneous expectations, the ability of investors to lend
and borrow unlimited amounts of money at the riskless rate, etc.
Nevertheless, it seems to provide a good approximations to the
behavior of security markets. Furthermore, large institutional
investors are starting to act as if they believed in the CAPM model,
as evidenced by the establishment of an increasing number of index
funds .
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The Single Index Model seems appropriate for those investors
who wish to act on forecasting ability and still take advantage
of the benefits of portfolio diversification.
Despite the implications of theory, empirical evidence
indicates that most individual investors still hold portfolios
consisting of two to three stocks. For these investors, the
Full Variance-Covariance Model is appropriate.

SOME POINTS FOR DISCUSSION
A.

If the CAPM is a good description of reality, then relevant
information is being supplied to investors, either by the
accounting profession or by others. Auditing still has a
role, for the cost of funds to users is a function of
perceived risk. To the extent that the auditing process
can lower perceived risk, it can lower the cost of funds.

B.

If the CAPM does not hold, then the investor must forecast:

C.

1.

The expected level of future returns.

2.

Risk—measured either by the relationship between returns
and the market (Beta), or the variability of returns
and the co-movement between securities.

Expected Returns. Evidence shows that 85%-90% of the
information contained in annual earnings announcements is
incorporated in stock prices before the announcement is made.
This implies that information is leaked (signaled) to the
market earlier than the report. Should the. auditor be
responsible for the accuracy of this information, or for
at least seeing that it is not leaked to special groups?
Should the auditor be responsible for making sure that
relevant information that will bear on future returns be
made available to the public at the time that audited reports
are made available (or even more frequently)? To what
extent should non-accounting economic information be reported
and audited? For example, planned advertising and R & D
expenditures, contracted changes in wage costs, managers’
estimates of future earnings, planned changes In financing
policy.
Empirical evidence indicates that the market, in setting
stock prices, can see through alternative accounting methods.
Nevertheless, the cost of "seeing through" accounting
changes or alternative accounting methods is not costless.
Might not costs be reduced (returns increased) if the cost of
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restating financial data is borne once by the accountant,
rather than individually by each user?
D.

Risk. Very little has been done to link accounting data
to risk. Some work has been done on the prediction of
Betas from accounting data. While most of the variables
used as input to the prediction process are already
reported, two are not:
1.

The past level of Beta itself.

2.

The insensitivity of the firm's earnings to the average
level of earnings in the economy (earnings Betas).

Should the auditor see that these measures are included in
company reports?

To what extent should the auditor help the investor assess
risk by reporting probabilistic information when data is subject
to uncertainty?
To what extent should the auditor be responsible for reporting
major uncertainties in the company's future?

Since the tendency of the returns of a firm to change with
the returns in other companies is a major input to many portfolio
models; to what extent should audited statements contain measures
of the extent to which the returns of a firm vary with its
industry and other industries or economic sectors?
Discussion Leader, Martin Gruber
I guess I should start with a disclaimer.

When Mike first

asked me to talk about this topic, I found it an interesting one.

My background is in financial theory rather than in accounting.
In fact, before this morning, I'm not sure I knew what the job

of the auditor was; perhaps, I still don’t know what the job of

the auditor is.

But I would like to start with a few words about portfolio
theory in general.

I might note that there are three widely

accepted texts on portfolio theory which have come out in the last

-155-

few years.

Not one of those texts mentions accounting data or

financial data at all.

There are three theories of portfolio management, which make

different amounts of assumptions about the perfection of
capital markets.

The capital asset pricing model really states

that equilibrium exists in the capital market at all points in

time and that all investors should hold the market portfolio of
stocks, should not trade, should not try to make any judgments
on information.

The single-index model, another model which has

gained wide acceptance in recent years, is popularly called the

Beta model.

It holds that if investors have, or believe they

have, some forecasting ability, they will hold a portfolio which
is widely diversified, but not perfectly diversified.

This port

folio will tend to mirror market movements, and the only risk
in the portfolio is that concerned with how sensitive are movements
of stock prices to market movements.

We can capture the risk and

return by looking at the forecasted returns for each stock, plus

the relationship of each stock to the market.

And finally,

there is something we call the Full Variance/Covariance Model,

which says that holders of small portolios must be concerned

with non-market related risks as well as market related risk.

They have to look at the uncertainty associated with the return
on each stock, and the way stocks tend to move together, the

co-movement between each security.
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The Capital Asset Pricing Model makes a set of very-

strict assumptions about the way the capital market works.

It

assumes things like homogeneous expectations, and the fact

that investors can lend and borrow at a riskless rate of
interest.

However, despite these horrendous assumptions, It

appears to be a very good approximation to the way capital

markets really behave.

Furthermore, in the past few years,

we have seen institutional investors act to an increasing extent
as if they believed in this model,

the increasing use of index

funds for example, which are basically funds that are meant to
replicate the market portfolio, the total group of stocks out
there.

Several pension funds now run index funds and invest part

of their money in the market portfolio.

Private institutions

are offering index funds to customers.

The other extreme is this model that says you have to

look at the risk between all securities.

Recent empirical

evidence on investment behavior by individuals has suggested

that the bulk of individuals that hold stocks hold portfolios

that consist of two or three stocks, which would suggest, at
least in terms of behavior, that there is some reason to measure

the relationship between stock prices.
Even if we believe in the Capital Asset Pricing Model,

this doesn't say that there is no role for the auditor, because

the price of funds in this model is a function of perceived risk.
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To the extent that auditing lowers the perceived risk in
holding securities, it lowers the cost of funds to corporations

and can lead to a better allocation of funds in the economy.
When we talk about any of these models, we have to tie back
into the efficient market hypothesis.

Let me, more to provoke you than anything else, tell one
of my favorite efficient market stories.

I recently had occasion

to run some seminars in Europe on the state of capital markets in
Europe.

One of the more interesting speakers came from Austria. He

described the Austrian stock exchange. The Austrian Stock

Exchange consists of 24 stocks. Ninety eight percent of the

outstanding stocks are owned by two banks.

The whole stock

exchange consists of 3 clerks who keep transactions in large
ledger books by hand. Every stock is traded every day, because

if the stock isn't traded, naturally the subsidiary of a bank

will sell a. share back to the parent of the bank.

a recorded price each day.

So we have

The law requires that annual reports

be reported to the public within 3 years from the close of the

fiscal year.

However, it specifies that if there is any reason

for not reporting it, such as the director is out of the country
or one of the directors is ill, you can have an extension of

from 3 to 5 more additional years before the information is made

public.

There seems to be a large incidence of sickness among

directors in Austria, so, a typical time lag between the time the

fiscal year closes and the time the information is reported is
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somewhere between 5 and 8 years.

any worse than ours?)

(WN:

Does that system work

Well, the efficient market tests show

that that market is totally efficient. We have run the full set
of efficient market tests, and we concluded that that is a per

fectly efficient market.
There are other anomalies going on in the economy such

that once a year the banks are valued and they are valued according
to the market value of the securities they hold.

The timing

of the valuation is random, and prices usually double immediately
before the valuation process.
tests.

Again, we get efficient market

So, that while I believe in efficient markets, I think

we have to be careful in what we mean by efficient markets.
Markets are efficient with respect to the information that is

reported in the economy.

That does not imply that markets could

not be made more efficient by making the information flow to
those markets more efficient.

I would suggest that the standards

in Austria do not represent perfect accounting standards, even

as little as I know about accounting.

So, I guess I would, having

listened to the proceedings this morning,

caution against

believing that,because we find efficiency tests in the United

States, the auditor’s job is done perfectly and that all information

which is of potential use to investors is already there.

Another point that struck me had to do with the cost of
processing information.

We have a certain amount of evidence in
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the literature that the investor is able to see through different

accounting methods, providing we footnote, and make known
what is going on.

There are costs to seeing through alternative

accounting methods, and it is not clear to me that some of

these costs are not better borne once and for all by the
accountant than many, many times by each of the 300,000 investors
who are sitting out there in the

market.

Finally, I return to risk and perhaps make two points.

One is that I see one of the key roles of the auditing function

as attempting to decrease risk and make the market more efficient
in that sense.

And second of all, I wonder about the possibility—

and I may be wandering from the auditor's role to the accountant’s
role—but I wonder about the possibility of making probabilistic
information available to investors.

That is, it seems to me

that a lot of work goes into taking a certain amount of events,
which are at best uncertain in nature, and trying to reduce those
to a single number and throwing away all the information that we
had to absorb and work with in reducing that to a single number.

It seems to me that this information that we are dealing with in
portfolio analysis is extremely valuable to investors.
Well, I have listed some more points in my outline, but I

have covered the ones that I find interesting at this point.
GENERAL DISCUSSION

Chairman (DRC):

Could you explain to us what you mean

by decreasing risk?

Discussion Leader (MG):

In a portfolio sense, if we are

holding small portfolios, what we ideally like to be able to
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ascertain or be able to hold are stocks whose price movements

do not move in unison.

If we buy a— in very simplistic terms—

if we buy a company that runs ski resorts in New England, we

would also like to buy a company that operates a summer resort
in New England, to protect ourselves from the variances of

weather.

Gold stocks are typically held out as examples of

stocks that tend to move counter to other stocks in the economy.
If we buy a portfolio that is composed totally of automobile
stocks and companies that sell products which are related to

automobile sales, we are exposing ourselves to one type of risk
in the economy.

(RK):

How can auditors reduce this kind of risk?

Discussion Leader (MG):

I’m not sure that they can

reduce it, but I believe they can supply information on it.

(MS:

Like what?)

Well, in recent years, out of the accounting

profession has come, for example, a lot of attempts to measure
the sensitivity of a company’s earnings to the sensitivity of

earnings in the economy.

That is a valuable piece of information

reported upon in the economic-financial literature.

It might

be worthwhile thinking about and incorporating that information

in accounting statements.

(RE):

That is an accounting question now, not an

auditing question.

Discussion Leader (MG):

Well, I guess I view the role of
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an auditor as saying, not just., has the accountant done his

job, but what job would I like the accountant to do.

Not being

an auditor, I can’t make that distinction.

(RE):

On an individual job basis?

In other words you

think...

Discussion Leader (MG):

No, set standards across com

panies for what type of information do I think is relevant for
investors, and I will be concerned with investors, because
that is my thing to look at.

(MS):

Well, I think it is fair game if we are looking

at the problem of what extensions of auditing might be useful,
as we have the whole day.

If we constrain ourselves to what is

the current standard in accounting then we narrow our objective.
I think what is being inferred here is a kind of analysis of a

sort of a profit variance, based on externalities, macro
economic factors, perhaps, versus the industry versus the micro.

(RK):

That is based on publicly available information.

I could go home and in a week could publish a list of the
accounting Betas for all publicly traded companies.

So, I'm

not sure that that is a particularly interesting question to
focus on, because it is basically operating on publicly available

information.
Discussion Leader (MG):
information.

Well, it is publicly available

I could walk into Merrill Lynch, for example—
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Merrill Lynch sells rate of return Betas I could walk

into Merrill Lynch and I can buy rate of return Betas.

If

I’m an institutional customer, I can purchase an evaluation
service and pay $80,000 a year in commissions to get that

service.

The question is whether the auditor, who can make

that service available at considerably less than $80,000 a year

per customer, should make some of that information available
to the public.

(EH):

I guess we would agree that that is a question.

Discussion Leader (MG):

Yes, I’m putting it forth as

a question; I don't have an answer.

(CW):

I have an answer.

How much credibility do you

want to attach to what Merrill Lynch publishes, to those
accounting Betas of all those companies?

certificate on it?

Do you want our

Do you want the public to really believe that

stuff, that those accounting Betas are all alright?

What was

the accounting Beta on Equity Funding?

Discussion Leader (MG);

If you are talking about replicable,

historical information, you have a piece of replicable, historical
information, now.

Do you want to make a value judgment that

that information is nonsense, and shouldn’t be reported on by
the accounting profession?
(CW):

more time.

I don’t believe that it is nonsense.

You missed my point.

Let me just come around one

One of the things we all hold precious, I think,
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as auditors is the attest function that we are involved in.

If we get involved in things where we are not expert hut

would reflect on our general credibility

and get us tangled

up in things that we really aren't able to do very well, it

is going to reflect on the attest function.

That is one thing.

Now, so long as we are involved with the attest function, if we
put our name on something like the Merrill Lynch accounting Betas,
our
what is that going to do to/credibility and the other work we

are supposed to be doing in the public interest?

I guess

there is an implied answer to my question.

(MSh):
that.

I don't think Marty is saying that you should do

I think—and maybe I’m adding a little something to

you Marty, and you may disagree with me, correct me if that is

the case—I think the substance of Marty's remarks for auditors
is the following:

estimation of Betas is a problem outside the

realm of auditors, but estimation of Betas may depend on

accounting information, which could be made more reliable by
auditors.

So that the auditor’s role lies in that.

(EH):

(MSh):

I guess that isn’t what we heard.
Okay, what did you mean to say, was it something

like I threw back at you now or something different?

Discussion Leader (MO):
can make clear in this sense.

It is something that perhaps I

Perhaps I'm expanding the role of

this group beyond the role that they want to play, but it seems
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to me that the important thing that we have hinted at a

lot this morning, and haven’t really gotten to is, what is the

value—we are going to talk about cost-benefit analysis, perhaps
in a more restricted sense—but what is the value of information
to the users of information?

We can say we believe in the

efficient market hypothesis, and it doesn’t really matter if

we expand the information set that is provided.

But I think a

key role that we should be looking at is supplying information that
is valuable to the users of that information.

And if I were an

auditor, I would want to have some sense of value when I looked

at what I put my time and cost s into replicating.

If a piece

of information isn’t valuable to users of information, I wouldn’t
be terribly concerned with making sure that I measured that to

the penny, whereas if information is extremely valuable, I

would be concerned with it.

(EH):

Would you believe that we attach a tremendous

sense of value to placing our signature on that single piece

of paper in which we express an opinion on a set of financial

statements?

Would you believe also that we have no overwhelming

desire to compete with Merrill Lynch in reporting Betas nor
do we see a need to do that just because we can do it cheaper?

(JR):

I go along with Mel in saying that this highlights

that portfolio constructors, people who construct portfolios,

the first party investors, want to estimate the expected return
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on a stock and the risk, the systematic risk.

Now, not much

attention—in fact, no attention at all—was paid to the
uncertainty of information used

in making these estimates.

and I think what follows, within the efficient market findings,
within the portfolio model, is that the auditor’s role would be—

the auditor would fulfill a beneficial social function by—reducing,

improving or enhancing the accuracy of that accounting information

which goes into the formulation of expected returns and risk.
(CW):

Yes, but see what you want to do—what you want

to do—is to change our role.

I didn't go into public

accounting to become an investment advisor.

If I had wanted to

do that, I would have joined Bill Norby's group.

I went into

this profession thinking that what I would do is be engaged in
the attest function on historial financial statements, and

suddenly find that I am being asked to get involved in a whole
predictability process and that I’m supposed to make all kinds
of normative judgments, some of which—listening to what has

gone on here today—aren't even in the financial area.

They have

to do with management performance, best use of assets, etc.
(LL):

Chuck, if 10 years from now, the investor is

placing 90% of his reliance upon forecasts instead of historic

statements, we don't want to be like the guy who was shoeing
horses when the automobile was coming in.
(CW):

We are already doing that, according to the

empirical accounting research studies.

These guys can demonstrate
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that that is already the case.

All the annual report does

is confirm what has gone before.

We don't provide all the

information which is of value; we just provide some little
part of that that is attested to and confirms what happened

in the past.
do it well.

That is what I want to do, and I think we can

If you make me get into the rest of that, you are

going to destroy my basic function and my credibility probably.
(MSh):

When people cease to believe that you are

supplying information which is substantially valuable for their
decision, you won't get paid.

That is why, before we can

answer the question about what auditors do, we have to think
about the uses to which the information is put, that is, we

have to think about the decision models of users of information.
Marty is saying, here are some decision models;
models deals with estimation of these Betas.

one of the

He thinks, perhaps,

that Betas can be estimated using accounting data.

If that is

the case—so so far, you are not in the picture at all yet as
an auditor—if that is the case, though, where does he get the

accounting data?

Well, presumably he uses data which has been

audited, and hence the quality and reliability of that data is

better than if it wasn’t audited when it is used and Betas are
chosen and decisions are made.

So, you are an important guy

because you are supplying the right information upon which the
rest of the decision process follows.
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(JR):

Otherwise, what is the objective of the attest

function?
(RE):

Let me take another crack at it.

(CW):

It is to confirm the historical results, period.

I don’t visualize my function as analyzing them, giving you a
predictability quotient, or anything of the sort.

Discussion Leader (MG): I’m not asking you to analyze

them, and I'm not asking you to predict in this one instance.
There may or may not be value there.

That is a separate issue.

What I’m saying is that you should—what I'm asking for

is—

ascertain what aspects of the historical information are

important to investors.

(GB):

What if the answer is none?

What evidence would

you be satisfied with if the answer is yes?
Discussion Leader (MG):

Well, I guess I don't believe

that the answer is none, and I will use your own argument,
George.

If the answer is none, we wouldn't have auditing firms
(GB):

You go back to what was just said.

The function

of the auditor, at least in part—I personally believe it is

almost the whole—is the attest function, namely, to confirm

what people otherwise know, and further than that, to uncover
mal-uses of resources.

And I completely agree that it is an

extremely difficult and important function.
Discussion Leader (MG):

It is not clear to me that if

we didn’t have auditors, if we didn't have accountants, that
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they would know that.

And one of the reasons people know it,

one of the reason things are made public, is because that

auditor's statement is going to come out.
(WN
):

You could have nonaudited statements, and the

information of a sort

would be out.

Discussion Leader (MG):

It might not be out as accurately

as it would be in the presence of auditors.

(WN):

Okay, that is the marginal value of the audit, per se

(GB):

Shall we move to a situation where we audit every

other year?
(MSh):

Is that enough of a discipline on the system?
That is a matter of costs and benefits.

In

other words, I think that the big point which Marty is making is

the tradeoff Betas and that kind of thing.
I can generalize this a little bit,is this:

The big point, if

that it is

important for auditors to be aware of how users make use of
audited information, that is, be aware of what are the decision
models, the decision processes.

You don't have to invent the

decision models, but you should be aware of them.

Aware of

what is going on. And if these in fact are the decision processes

being used, and if you supply—as I believe auditors do supply—
key Information which is part of that process, then you are
playing an extremely important role.

The attest function is

probably very important

(EH):

Excuse me,

can I interrupt a minute?

I think it
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is fair to say that we auditors do not believe we supply
any information except information as to the credibility of
information supplied by somebody else.

Is there any auditor

here who disagrees with that?
(MSh): That is worth a lot, though

(EH):

Fine, but that really, I think, is not the way

in which you were using the expression, "supply information."

(JR):

"Supply information on the accuracy of that

information," what does it mean otherwise to confirm?

(WN):

When you look at the accounting profession, which

includes auditing and accounting standards, the accounting

standards are certainly having a lot to do with the kind of
information being supplied.

(LL):

We have some small practitioners who don't under

stand what you Just said.
(EH): Setting accounting standards is a job which we all
recognize has been delegated to the Financial Accounting Standards

Board, which is not part of the accounting profession.

We are

talking here today about auditors as auditors, but not always.
More often we slip over and talk to the question of what the
accounting principles should be, what information should be

provided by financial statements?

And this is at the heart of

a great deal of the difficulty we have.

(JR):

Are you saying a different thing?

You are confirming
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historical results.

You would agree to that definition?

Now, what does that mean to "confirm?”

To confirm means

that you are providing, as far as I’m concerned, to me, as
an investor, information on the accuracy of that information.
Now, if that is the case, and if...

(EH):

Right, but not as to the content of that

information.

(JR);

Well, I find it difficult to talk about accuracy

of information devoid or regardless of content.

(EH):

I’m sure you find it difficult, yet it is

necessary.

(JR):

But if that information is purely historical,

then investors will not need any information on accuracy. The

only reason that investors need that historical information is

because it is of value to future decisions and therefore to
prediction.
(MFC);

This may be a digression, but what you said

raises the point for me.

supply information.

You said that the auditor doesn’t

Well, I suppose, when he writes the

"subject to" opinion, he may be supplying some information.

(EH):

(MFC):

Well, he is supplying information about information

Right, exactly.

And to choose another example

I know we have Sandy Burton saying that the auditor is a partner,
at least,in the sense of determining the form in which infor-
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mation is provided.

Would you accept that view?

If you

accept that view, then there is an auditing role.

(EH):

Not necessarily.

I may not sound this way,

but I'm willing to see the auditing role expanded in any
reasonable direction and to any reasonable extent.

I'm

also insistent that, as we do that, we gear our thinking
to a distinction between, on the one hand, the identification
of the information that is to be presented and the question
of what we are proceeding under, as companies present that

information, and, on the other hand, the obligation of the
auditor in the attest function, which is not to decide what

has to be presented but rather to decide whether that which
is presented meets certain identified standards of accuracy or

whatever.

(JR):

How do you make materiality decisions?

(EH):

With great difficulty. We hope that in the fullness

of time we will have some advice from the FASB under its current

project.

(GS):

Well, in the meantime, we have the obligation to

decide what fairly present is.

(EH):

"Fairly present" means in conformity with GAAP.

(GS):

I understand, but there are many gaps in GAAP, so

that we have to make the decisions. The decisions that we

generally make are not those that GAAP specifically identifies
but those that fall within the cracks of GAAP.

sense, let’s just explore what Marty says,

And in that

it may have certain
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implications for auditing.

And I don’t know but I'm just

raising that as a question, in the following sense.

It

may have implications in the sense of what we as auditors

are willing to allow to be lumped together, to be aggregated
together, or what we insist is reported separately.

And

there I think that we could decide that, for instance, an assess
ment of how things vary in relation to the industry or the economy

would lead to certain suggestions, namely, that things that
vary in—certain activities—that tend to vary differently in

relation to the economy and the industry must be separately
set forth and can’t be lumped together with those things that
vary in the same general way as the economy or industry which

can be lumped together.

I would say that if that is an

important thing, then by lumping all different things that
vary in different ways in terms of the industry—and let's not
talk about Betas or anything else—we say now that really

wouldn't fairly present.

Can that give us some guide as to

the level of classification or disaggregation which we are

going to insist upon or which we are going to allow and so on?
That is not far beyond our role as auditors.
(EH):

I really can't respond to that, because it was

much too long a question, but my friend Mr. Werner apparently
understood it.

So I will defer to him.
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(CW):

What George is suggesting, for example, is that

we take a part public companies’ earning statements and
disaggregate the data, for example, on discretionary costs,
and provide that information—just so the academics understand

what it is we are saying as auditors.

But what I don’t want

to do is come up with a value judgment at bottom.

that Betas are out.

I think

I’m perfectly willing to break this data

a part and report as facts.

(GS) :

Chuck, I agree with you 100 percent, because

essentially the financial statements are only part of the
information about a company and they are the part about the

actual activities of a concern which you really can't pick up
from other—well, not as effectively—from other sources.

But,

I think, we must pay some attention to how these are packaged,

how they are aggregated, how they are disaggregated, and
what fairly presents about those—that limited set—and thus,

I think, we must pay some attention to these issues that Marty
raised.

(CW):

Yes, I agree; I will go this far with you.

We

do package in the earnings statement uncertain income, uncertain

revenues. Things that are very close to a cash term we package
with things that are very far from cash, and I think, indeed,
that we should start to disaggregate those things.

But if you

want from me predictability and interpretation, that is what
I don't want to do; I don't think that is my business.
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(WN):

Well, the president of the AICPA is suggesting

that maybe that is the next role of the auditor.

Chairman (DRC):

No, he didn't, not in his last speech.

In his last speech, he said that management should furnish the
interpretation and that the auditor might read and review

that but would not interpret the data.

(WN):

My statement was accurate with respect to a

certain point in time.
(EH):

Bill, maybe somebody talked to him in the

meantime.

Chairman (DRC):

The speech that was published in the last

issue of the Journal, the last one he made.
(RE):

May I ask a question that I think is about what

Marty is talking about?

If you look at the way information

comes in to the prices reflected in the market and so forth,
we have a situation here where accounting represents only a
small part of the information that goes into the valuation of
securities.

The question is one that hasn’t been addressed

except by Chuck and then in the negative sense of saying that he
didn't want to go beyond the historical information that is

disclosed.

Let’s say that, on a scale of 0 to 100, 100 percent

of the information enters into security prices and that we

auditors are now working on 10 or 20 percent of it or whatever
percentage you care to use to reduce the uncertainty connected
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with that.
forget that.

That is fine; if that is what we do today, let’s

The questions that I think you have to ask are:

Is there a role for the auditor in reducing the uncertainty

connected with the other 80% of the information which enters

into market prices?

And if the auditor is the most efficient

way to reduce uncertainty with respect to one part of the
information set—that is, he can do it once for the benefit

of all stockholders—is there theoretically any reason why he

shouldn't be exercising the same type of efficient reduction
of uncertainty with respect to the rest of the information set?
Now, Chuck has expressed clearly his view that he as an auditor

doesn’t want to get beyond the part of the information that he
deals with but I as a practitioner would like to state that I

represent, maybe a different constituency among practitioners
who feel not only that they would like to get involved with the

rest of this information set but also that the financial
information is becoming less and less relevant and that I,

personally—I'm fairly young, as you can see—am not interested
in being in a buggy-whip industry.

I think that our future

is in the rest of the information set. I think that that is
implicit in this whole market pricing question, and we haven't
really addressed that.

Chairman (DRC):

You have to perceive it properly because

now in the current moral climate, S and M are coming in and
whips are coming back.
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Well, I don't think it's going to be as big

a market as...

(RK):

One of the problems we are encountering here

is called the "kinky" demand curve

Chairman (DRC):

we need a break.

That was really a lead into a break;

Let’s take a five-minute break.

Chairman (DRC):

I promised to allow a couple of

people to comment, before we move to cost-benefit analysis.
Bob, do you want to say something?

(RH):

The reason I wanted to get it in here was that

it ties in with portfolio context in the sense that if we do
look at the auditor as someone who is trying to minimize the

possibility of a report being issued that is fraudulent or
something such as that, individuals, in a portfolio context,
may be able to diversify away from that same type of risk.

Although I know of no research looking into that question, it
would seem to be a very logical way to approach the issue.
In the same sense that in the portfolio context, as far as the

underlying business risks to the firm are concerned, we can
diversify away from a lot of that.

If we have a sufficient

spreading and the same kind of context for the risk of reporting
errors, we may not have as big a problem as we think, if we
can find diversification to reduce that risk.

Discussion Leader (MG):

Individuals can diversify away

-187-

reporting errors.

At the same time, although that takes

some of the had effects away from reporting errors, it
doesn't mean that we are, as well off whether we have reporting
errors or not, because in that capital asset pricing is the

amount of risk in the market and the market price of risk.

If we have more errors across the economy, we don't worry
about them.

(RH):

What you are doing is changing the amount of risk.
I guess what that would seem to convey, then,

would be that we would want to look at the average level of

risk instead of looking at specific firms.

Much like portfolio

analysis suggests that we shouldn't be spending a lot of money
looking for underpriced stocks, maybe we are spending too much

money looking for the Equity Funding, looking for those kinds
of frauds, when we should concentrate more on specifying some

average level of risk that we want to exist in the economy for
reporting errors and designing auditing standards that should

try to accomplish the realization of that average level of risk.
Discussion Leader (MG):

I think this gets into the

cost-benefit analysis, and perhaps one point I did not make as
well as I would have liked to, which is the fact that the auditor

really has a scarce resource to allocate, namely, his time or

the amount of money he has to work with.

I meant my brief talk

in part to be a plea for trying to discover where that scarce

resource was best spent, the areas in which we are most concerned

with eliminating errors.
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THE COST BENEFIT ASPECTS OF THE AUDIT FUNCTION

Outline of Issues: Prepared by Robert K. Elliott

I.

II.

Background
A.

The cost-benefit aspect of the auditing function has
not been clearly defined.

B.

Research on this subject is badly needed.

1.

Benefits have not been fully identified, much
less quantified.

2.

Nonauditee users, who constitute the bulk of
the consumers of the audit product, rarely in
today’s audit practice contribute directly to
the payment for the audit.

Further research is necessary to precisely define costbenefit relationships, but the following specific items
are readily identifiable:

A.

Costs
1.

Auditors' salaries, fringe benefits, overhead,
and profit, which are typically paid by auditees.

2.

Disruption in normal routines of audited entities,
which are typically absorbed by auditees.

3.

Additional records and systems that are required
to satisfy auditability requirements, which are
incurred by auditees.

4.

Litigation costs (as distinguished from awards)
arising as a consequence of audits, which may be
incurred by both auditors and auditees. (Litig
ation awards may wind up being costs to auditors
and auditees and benefits to users.)

5.

Losses incurred by information users that result
from reliance on information because it had been
audited but nevertheless was erroneous.
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B.

Benefits
1.

Improvement in decision outcomes that result
from the increased usefulness of information
that has been audited, which accrues to inform
ation users.

2.

Improved allocation of economic resources,
which accrues to all members of society.

3.

Motivational impacts of an audit. Auditee per
sonnel may make greater effort to avoid intentional
or unintentional errors if they know their work
will be audited. This benefit, which involves
both the improvement in the accuracy of information
and reduction in losses from defalcations, is
shared by the information users and auditees.

4.

Professional advice provided by auditors. During
the course of audits, auditors often assist
auditees by identifying ways to improve the
efficiency and effectiveness of the audited entities
Assuming that action taken as a result of auditors’
advice causes no impairment of auditors' inde
pendence, this benefit accrues to auditees with
no cost to information users.

Chairman, Douglas R. Carmichael
Bob, can you give us a brief background on your work
on cost-benefit analysis?
Discussion Leader, Robert K. Elliott

Well, I feel that I have a definite advantage here over

the three individuals who led the previous sessions, in that
in each case, there was a body of research and there were facts
established by the research.

I’m in an area where there has

basically been nothing done, and therefore almost anything I

say is, at least, plausible.

That is a part of my problem.

So many of the discussions that have come up today at one
point or another, we get back to the question of the cost of
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having audit involvement in these areas versus the benefits.

So, my section here is to look a little bit more explicitly
at this question of costs and benefits.

The costs to some extent are defined, and I have got
them listed here under costs, at least some of the ones that

you can clearly think of.

that aren’t so obvious.

There may be other costs, too,
There are costs that companies have,

for example, when by divulging more and more information,

they give their competitors advantages over them, and those
costs, opportunity costs and so forth aren't captured here.

But at least the direct costs are here, and these include
auditors’ salaries and fringes, and so forth, in the form
of fees.

Although this audit benefit is really for the bene

fit of not only the present owners of a company but also future

owners and, in some respects, society at large, the fee is
nevertheless borne on behalf of all those people by the com
pany itself.

Now I understand that one of the issues under

consideration is the way in which this function should be

financed, but at least presently, auditees pay these fees.
So that is one of the costs.

Another one, which is not negligible, is disruption
in the work routines of the auditees, because we come in
and ask a lot of questions and disturb the general routine.

There is some cost there, which I suppose, if you wanted
to investigate,

you could get an order of magnitude
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estimate on that.

There are systems that companies maintain

that they probably wouldn’t maintain at all if they didn’t
know that we were going to come along and audit them, so,
these are costs which are imposed.

There may be offsetting

benefits there, too, because management may get some benefit
in terms of better information internally, but at least there

is a cost in maintaining these systems.

There are litigation

costs, which may be borne by the auditors, may be borne by some

of the others, but these are certainly some of the quantifiable
costs involved because of the attest function.

There are losses that information users incur, because

they rely on information that they thought the auditor had gotten

the imprecision out of but in fact had not. Those costs are
getting into the realm where they are pretty difficult to measure

For example, let’s say that through an audit error in a very
simple case, the financial statements were wrong and I, as one

owner of a company made $10,000 that objectively I shouldn’t and
Doug lost $10,000 because he was on the other side. What is the

cost involved there? It is not necessarily $10,000 because to the
rest of you there was no cost or benefit.

It is only between

the two of us and the distribution of our resources, so it is

a little difficult to put a number on that cost that means

anything relative to the broader picture of how society costs

out this audit function.

Well, those are some of the costs.
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On the benefits side, the benefits are more nebulous
than the costs in general, I suppose, if you want to get down
to a quantification.

But there is the improvement in decision

outcomes that comes from having better quality of information

available through the audit process, and this benefit goes to
the owners of the securities, basically, present and potential,
as they get into it.

There is the improved allocation of economic

resources because, after all, the grand total of all the indi

vidual investment decisions represents the macro-economic in
vestment decision and to the extent that that is a better decision

in the aggregate, that benefit accrues to all the citizens,

whether or not they are stockholders. There are motivational
impacts of an audit which I have referred to earlier today as a

deterrent effect.

In many cases, management will behave dif

ferently because they know that their actions are subject to
review annually, and any discrepancies will be publicized, and

that is a very significant benefit which is shared by really

the information users and to some extent the companies being
audited themselves.
Then there is the fourth one, which is a side benefit,
and that is that the auditors are experienced because they
go around and see many different companies and typically

what they do when they look at an individual entity that

they are auditing, if they see inefficiencies or poor

business practices, they will point these out.

There is very
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little additional cost involved in doing this, hut there may
be a significant benefit to the auditees in terms of the

efficiency of their operations, assuming that the auditor
doesn’t in some way lose some independence by this by making

suggestions which then later put him in a position of having
to report on the implementation of his suggestion.

And you

have all these independence questions, which most of us who

are in auditing feel do not significantly detract from inde

pendence, but nevertheless, the perceptions of outsiders are
also important here and have to be considered.

So, there is

that possibility there.
Really, these costs

benefits are different enough

to quantify, but even if we could quantify them, we might not
be able to answer all of these audit questions, because we

can’t really make decisions here unless we have some set of
values that we are trying to work to as a society.
me give you an example.

Now, let

In a socialist economy, where all

the resources are owned by the government for the benefit of

the people, the resource distribution question—who owns the
resources—is not even a question that comes up because there

are no shareholders, per se, no trading going on.

So, the

information errors don’t really distribute assets erroneously

between Doug and myself at all.

So, that aspect doesn't even

come up in a socialist economy, whereas

in a capitalist economy

-194-

that is a significant aspect of it.

Obviously, in those two

different types of economies, you would be paying for dif

ferent purposes for having audits.

Now, most types of

economies do have an attest function, an audit function,

but they are there for different reasons.
So, really, there ,are basically these two outcomes
of having audits, as I see it, at least.

The first is the

question that the improved reliability of information
results in better resource allocation over the whole economy,
and those benefits go to everybody.

The second is that

auditing reduces the misallocation of income and wealth

between individuals, that just come up because of either

random or deliberate fraudulent errors in reporting by

companies.

If you are going to make cost-benefit choices,

you have got to decide between the two of those, because in

some cases, they are inconsistent.
Let me give you an example which already came up
today, and that is the question of:

should the auditor

act as insurer against investment risks?

The basic concept

here is that the auditor is in a position to indemnify

those who made wrong decisions based on information errors in
the financial statement—let’s say he has got to pay out X

dollars per year for that purpose.

So, all the auditor has

got to do is divide that up, add it to his fee as in effect,
an insurance premium on top of the fee, charge it, and he will

act as a sort of the Blue Cross of the investment world.

He
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a loss.

Well, that has been seriously proposed, I guess,

by some people.

But what you have to look at is that that

view of things really very much goes toward the second of

the functions that I have outlined, that of minimizing irrational
redistributions of wealth based on bum accounting data.

The

other side of it, if you look at the resource allocation ques
tion across the economy, is that if the auditor is. an insurer
against investment risks, such that all investment risks are

reduced, in fact, if they are ultimately insured against all

risk, all securities would sell at the same price as Treasury
Bills, because they would all have virtually no risk.

In this

type of case, where all investments sell at the same risk level,
there is no incentive to people to invest in things which are

socially beneficial or which maximize—whatever you want to

maximize, GNP, or whatever—and so therefore if we insure it

to too great an extent against investment risk, which helps
them on one side of this equation, we may in fact degrade the

performance of the economy as a whole in terms of the way in

which it allocates resources.

And so therefore, you have to

decide, when making the cost-benefit trade-offs, which of

those two is more important to you.

If you look at the way the courts and the SEC are
operating, it is clear that they prefer to minimize individual
investment risks. In other words, if you look at all the

litigation here, you find that it is between people who feel
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that they have been had.

In most cases, a plaintiff is

coming in and saying,” I lost money because of bad

information, so I want to recover it from somebody.”
All of this legal activity really is to minimize this
random redistribution of wealth because of accounting

errors, and we really don't see much activity in the legal

sense aimed at the resource allocation question. But,

given that we have to make some choices in this area, we
really can't do it in the absence of some societal goals

and values.

So, it just seems to me that in answering these ques
tions about what is the proper role of the auditor, we can't
ask them in a vacuum, but we have to ask them with respect to

some defined goals that we have within the economy as a whole.

It depends on how those choices come out, and I really don’t
think that It is the proper role of auditors to make those
choices.

I think that that is the political process, as to

what are the important things going on, and it is based on

that process that the proper role of auditing, among many
other things, has got to be determined.
So, about all I have done here is to list off some of

the costs and benefits in a qualitative sense as a basis to
get the discussion rolling, but there has been very little work
done in this area that would help us to quantify these at the
present time.
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General Discussion

(MSh):

Bob, I think that you presented a pretty clear

statement about some things that we have talked about this
morning and kind of dropped.

For one thing, I think you are

saying that we really have to look at the whole economic
system, given that we will never make it all the way from that
up until what the auditor should do, within say, the life of

this Commission.

Even that being the case, I still think we

would do better in terms of anything the Commission might come
out with at this point, if we keep that in mind.

Because just

because we don’t have a strong handle on this whole economic
process, that is not to say that we don’t know something about

it.

We do know quite a bit about, at least in terms of an

outline, how information is, or could be plausibly used.

We

can't prove it; we can talk about how information may well be
plausibly used in the overall question of resource allocation
in the national economy.

We have to keep that in mind because,

as soon as we talk about the auditor's role, we are starting to

compartmentalize.
Let’s look at the total flow of information because you
can’t completely ignore the question of what is happening in the
overall system when you are an auditor.

Nobody is going to tell

you that this is what you are supposed to do, and you wouldn’t
be content in simply doing it, because nobody is smart enough
to tell you what you should do.

On the other hand, I don't
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think an auditor would want to be totally relegated to that
situation.

The plain fact is that the boundaries of auditing

cannot be precisely defined anymore than the total understanding
of the overall system can be defined.

But, having said on the

one hand that we can’t do it, on the other hand, I think we can,
because I think we do know enough about the overall economic
process I think we can trace—certainly conceptually—and I
We can trace the flow

think we can slowly begin to quantify.
of information.

We can talk about how firms make capital

budgeting decisions.

We can talk about how capital markets

provide capital through efficient terms.
role of information in this process.

We can talk about the

Then, we can talk about,

how do we insure the reliability of this information, which is

getting closer to what the auditor is after.

But I think that in order to talk very practically

about what the auditor really does, we really can't ignore the
overall process.

That is one of the things I read in your

statement and that is that whatever comes out about what the

auditor does, unless it tries, even imperfectly, to relate this
to the question of the overall resource allocation in the economy,
we are not going to be able to make our best efforts at this

definition.

At least we should feel that it is consistent with

whatever understanding we have about resource allocation in the

economy.
Discussion Leader (BE):

You can’t do that without some
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reasonably explicit statement about what you are trying
to accomplish.

(MSh):

Well, you can do that.

Let's say you want

to maximize GNP, then you talk about how is GNP generated

and it is a long chain.
Discussion Leader (PE):

Let’s take the assumption that

what you want to do is maximize GNP.

Therefore, you are

interested in optimal resource allocation; you really don't
care who owns the resources.

your only objective.

(MSh):

That is what you said; that is

You really don't care who owns them.

Suppose you list several objectives.

You might

list maximize GNP, and you might talk about...

Discussion Leader (RE):

You might but that is my point.

You can't make these decisions unless you are willing to state
what you are trying to maximize or optimize.
(MSh):

Right, you have to list all your goals.

You

are saying, okay, that the minimum goals have to do with
generation of total wealth and distribution of wealth.

Discussion Leader (RE):

They are two that you can think

of pretty quickly.
(MSh):

Yes, but as you and I have talked privately on

other occasions, the question of distribution may be of less
importance if everybody holds a diversified portfolio.

Discussion Leader (RE):

That is right.

You can diversify

away the risk, but the whole legal system acts as if we were
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doing exactly the opposite.

It is holding us accountable for

individual risks—when the market—when all this information

we are talking about--George and Bob and Marty all bring up

information—which tells us that, as a public policy matter,
that is probably misdirected.

(MSh):

Well, maybe you can convince everybody to get off

the hook and say:

portfolios.

"Look, everybody should have diversified

That being the case, don't sue us when we go

wrong on one company, as long as we apply the reasonable princi

ples that have been agreed to.”

Discussion Leader (RE):

Well, one of the things I think

that would be okay in some sense is to say that it is up to

people to diversify away their risk, but, on the other hand, I

think the auditor has to be faced with some possible penalties
to give him the incentive to do a good Job.

Now, maybe what

you want to say is, that instead of having this random system
where plaintiffs, if they happen to prevail in court, can
collect from the auditor and that provides the incentives,

maybe you ought to say, ’’the hell with it, investors can never
collect" but we will set up a fine system—the government

collect a fine if they find auditors misperforming.

will

Now, there

are other ways to structure this, and although the Cohen
Commission does not have the authority—at least it is not
obvious that they have the authority—to change the legal system
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in this country, at least if they make observations along

these lines, presumably that might have an impact on future

developments.

But if they don’t make any observations at

all in this regard, then there is no hope that they would
have that type of influence on future developments.

This is

to some extent, I guess, a little too abstract.

The problem—getting back down to the decisions that

the Commission has within their range—the problem is this.
They have identified a group of issues:

Should the auditor

be responsible to detect management fraud?

Should the auditor

address himself to interim financial statements? and so on
and so forth.

There is a group of issues, and they are

outlined in that booklet.

The problem is that if you look

at these things strictly from a standpoint of moralistic
reasoning, you could say:

’’well, fraud is bad, objectively

bad in our value-system; we don’t want it, so the auditors ought

to find it.

So, let's vote, and we find that the vote is 7 to

nothing on the Commission that the auditor is responsible for

fraud.”

Now, that could be done; and they could resolve all

the issues like that and probably could dispense with them in
one long meeting.

But, does that make any sense without at

least considering, what are the costs associated with finding
this?

So, it is in that sense that I think you have to address

this cost problem.

What does it actually cost?

Chuck mentioned
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a figure, that we spend a. billion dollars on auditing a, year.

I think that that is a lower limit, certainly. (CW: Public

Companies) Well, I think that is low, even for public
companies.

We spend a hell of a lot of money on this.

Suppose we said, "let’s get into quarterly auditing, finding
fraud and so forth," and to do this, we would have to spend
another 2 billion dollars a year, which would imply, if

Chuck’s figure is right, that we would have to go out and buy
another quarter of a million auditors.

There is nothing too

difficult about that; we could do that in about six months.
(JR):

Relative to the Defense budget, this is nothing.

(CW):

A quarter of a million competent auditors?

Discussion Leader (RE):

No, just the same as today.

My point is that it is too easy to resolve these questions
on a moralistic basis without considering whether the cost
is justified to do this, and if we could only get our hands on

some of these costs and benefits, maybe we could at least make
decisions that, although they weren’t scientific, were

reasonable.

(MS):

We have danced around one thing quite a bit here

today, and I think this might be a time to get to it.

Forget

the fraud, let’s get back to the illegal payment bit.

We

sort of touched on it and left.

On the cost-benefit notion,

recognizing, I think we hear, that the securities market and

their model is unaffected by disclosure of illegal payments,
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at least, so I heard.
is almost zero.

So, the benefit to the security holder

You certainly have costs in pursuing this.

How do you resolve this issue on what involvement the

auditor should have in illegal payments, if you try to lean
on the cost and benefit model for guidance so that this

Commission can take a position on the specific issue of
disclosure of illegal payments?
one because it is with us.

Let’s address that specific

It was mentioned earlier, and I

think we sort of walked away.
Discussion Leader (RE):
could probably cost it out.

Well, on the cost side, we

So, the real question is, what

is the benefit?

(RK):

It would possibly be a function of the level of

payments you want to detect.

If you want to detect a 20 million

dollar payment to a corporation, that will cost a certain
amount.

If you want to detect a $1,000 payment, that will

cost somewhat more.

So, there is a whole envelope of cost

functions, depending upon the level of payment you want to
detect.
(MS):

I would like to hear about the benefit, parti

cularly to the security holder, the analyst, if there is a
benefit there. Or else are we looking for other kinds of
benefits, if there are any, if they can be determined? Do we
have something with costs and no benefits?

Won’t most of our
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problem areas be in this kind of a situation?

(LL):

Does the disclosure bring further costs or, rather,

does it bring benefits or just further costs?

(MS):

If there are more costs then we will stay on the
I’m searching for a benefit for someone.

cost side.

(WN):

I think that as you say, that the disclosure

of these illegal payments does not seem to have any perceptible

effect on the market; but, of course, there are a lot of

other effects, a lot of other forces in the market at any one

time, so it is hard to sort them out.

We have a questionnaire

in process among analysts, so we can get a little clue on it.
I think in general, it has not had much effect.

However, I

would say that investors would probably rather invest in

companies that do business the right way than the wrong way.
(MS):

I have some question on that, because of the

history of those companies which limited their portfolios to
investments in companies which were concerned with environmental

conditions and the rest.

They didn't quite make it.

So you

say there is a preference to the investor in an "honest” versus
a ’’dishonest” management.

(WN):

I assumed all other things being equal.

(MS):

Even other things being equal, I raise the

question.

This enters into the decision model.
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(WN
):

Let me finish.

I think that the substantive

question here is the right of the corporation to exist in
a private enterprise economy in which the public has con
fidence in it

carrying out its operations in what it regards

as an ethical manner.

Now, the standards of ethics are

going to change; and I think we have had a change here in
what we regard as proper all of a sudden in terms of these
kinds of payments to do business abroad.

Maybe the next

focus will be on payments we make to do business within the

United States.
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(MFC):

They are in the works and will be coming out

very soon.

(WN):

So, the security holder has an indirect interest

in maintaining a private corporation with a franchise to do

business, and if society demands that corporations be audited
to prove their ethical behavior, well then that is what you
are going to have to pay for.

That is about the size of it,

as I see it.

(MFC):

In the taxi ride down here today, which Bill

and I shared, either he or I posed the example of a company
whose business in a particular area, was declining and it just

couldn’t compete very effectively with its competitors.

They

were considering closing the plant and putting 1,000 people

out of work, and then someone suggested that if you take care
of the purchasing agent of X,Y and Z companies, perhaps you

could get some business.

So, you have got the ethical question

of is it illegal, or is it bribery?

On the other hand, you

would be putting 1,000 people out of work.

management do with that?

And what does

Now, obviously that is a strange

example, but it was used for our discussion down here in 20

minutes.
Discussion Leader (RE):
of objectives.

It goes back to the statement

If you take as objectives maximization of GNP

and minimization of distributional anomalies of wealth, you
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can't measure any benefit of honesty or dishonesty against

those two objectives.

If you had a further societal objective

that we want to have some ethical standards, I think that is
a value statement, that it is fine, and the people will

probably vote for that, but then the benefits have to be
measured against that, which is not a financial type of benefit
at all.

It is a separate societal benefit.

(DRC):

There is the other side of it.

There is one

valid point raised about the corporate accountability system
and the fact that when the means are used for one purpose, the

corporation does lose control.

The only case that I'm aware

of that is public where that was true was Exxon, where the

improper or illegal payments duly authorized by the corporation

were exceeded in the Italian subsidiary by the payments that
the head of the subsidiary went ahead and made on his own,

unknown to the corporate hierarchy, using essentially the same

means of payment as the authorized payment.

So, the loss of

accountability is a fact.I wouldn't necessarily equate that,
as the SEC has, with materiality, in saying that because of

that

it is automatically material, but I think it is an

important factor.

(MFC):

This morning's Wall Street Journal had a story

about Firestone Rubber.

Which has all of that and a whole lot

more—I mean General Tire, sorry.
(GB):

In terms of the benefits, looking at it very

-208-

positively and not making any value judgments, I think one can

identify a number of benefits in terms of illegal payments.
One is the externality so far as the nation is concerned,

namely, what is the benefit of not permitting Lockheed to

bribe Japanese officials?

And I refer to Edwin Reichauer’s

column in Newsweek last week in which he points out that this
is so contrary to accepted behavior in Japan, that it has caused

the government

to topple and, indeed, is very seriously

detrimental to our relationship with that country.

Now, that

is an externality; it affects the rest of us, even though it
may be in Lockheed's own benefit to have made the bribery.
But then that becomes not something that an auditor is
concerned with, it is something the State Department is
concerned with.

It has something to do with U.S. foreign policy;

and there should be a role for the people who are charged with
that responsibility.

I didn’t know that the SEC was in the

foreign policy department, and I rather wonder whether it is

their governmental responsibility to be concerned with that,

although it may very well be Department of State’s responsibility.
The second benefit has to do with the thing that Doug mentioned,

namely, that it would mean a violation of internal control and

thereby a possibility that the corporation is out of control.
Another benefit is also' a question of the violation of the ethics
of a specific group of people.

Discussion Leader (RE):

Well, that comes back to value; you
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said you were excluding values—

(GB):

No, no, I’m exluding my values.

I'm not

making a personal value judgment on it, but I’m saying

value judgments then enter into it.

It may be horrendous

for some groups of people to believe that governments ought to

operate in a certain way, and they want to impose these
values on the rest of society. They feel this very strongly.

This is true of things like smoking

marihuana, smoking

cigarettes, abortions, divorce, you name it. There is a whole
range of values that people want to impose on other people,

because they feel them very strongly. And then you have
one other thing and that is the question of the police

requirement. At our conference that Doug was at in Rochester,
of the SEC
Lloyd Feller mentioned that he thought it was a citizen’s

responsibility (I hope I’m not misquoting.

I mentioned Doug

because I don’t want to misquote someone who isn't here.

Someone who is here can defend themselves.) to see to it that
the laws of the nation are upheld.

That is to say, any

miscreant is brought to the bar of justice.

So, if you see a

crime being committed, you are required as a citizen to report

that act to the police authorities.

In that case, the auditors

now become—if that is correct—an arm of the police authorities,
and have the responsibilities of operating as a policeman.

bears cost, of course.

That
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(DRC):

Mr. Feller, didn't say that exactly.

He said

that his position was that silence—given knowledge of the
crime—silence he thought was a crime.
(GB):

(DRC):

How is that different?

No, I wasn't saying it was different.

I just

wanted to interject the fact that there is a substantial body
of opinion on the other side.

Silence alone is not an

affirmative enough action to constitute a crime.

But he

did say that.
(GB):

These are some of the benefits against which we

match the costs, but I can't see any other benefits.

(JR):

Doesn't an illegal payment impose a potential

legal cost on the firm and thus become also a private benefit, in
that sense?
Discussion Leader (RE):

But, in most cases, the reason

we haven't looked at these illegal payments is that, when you
see these companies, confessing and settling—you know they

paid in a million dollars to a presidential election fund and

they were caught and forced to cough up a $10,000 fine—these
things are not important on the basis of financial materiality
in most cases.

If you look even at bribes in foreign countries

and you say,"well, holy mackerel, we could get kicked out of
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the country altogether.”

That has been going on this way—this

is the way they have been doing business—for 50 years.

So, what is the magnitude of

have never yet been kicked out.

the risk if we don’t disclose it?

disclose it.

They

It only happens if we

So, from a financial point of view, these things

may not be material enough to bother about. And if we are
interested in these because of financial materiality, how about

violations of all other laws which have possible monetary

effects—violations of anti-trust laws, and pricing, you

name it?
(JR):

Legal enforcement disincentives are not adequate.

Discussion Leader (RE):

That is not our problem as

auditors, but it is probably a true statement from the legal

point of view.

(WN):

Some people think those things ought to be

audited, too.

Discussion Leader (RE):

Well, the problem is whether

we should be the ones to audit them or not.

And that brings up

the question of the availability of information.

The lawyers

feel strongly that they don’t want their confidence violated
because they feel that they can’t do a decent job where their
clients feel that if they divulge any information, the lawyers

are going to run down to the police department.
precisely the same situation.

We have

We are operating in a situation
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where we have a great deal of cooperation, in that our clients—

when we ask them for something—they are forthcoming with
the information.

If they thought that we were arms of the

district attorney, we would in effect be able to get only
information out of them that we are able to subpena, or

something very closely akin to it.

So, you have to say,

"well, what is the benefit here in terms of extensions of
police state, police powers, versus the costs in the reduction

of value in the audit function" because now no one will cooperate

with auditors anymore.
(MSh):

So, that is a cost-benefit tradeoff, also

That brings up the fact that there is a wide

variety of values and goals being held by a wide variety of
parties.

When you try to take a hard look to at least identify

them, you realize all the conflicts that are going on.

It may

be that one should simply look for those kind of values and
goals which can be agreed on, on a consensus basis.

Those may

be very limited, may only be one or two or three, and for that

kind of thing, the Commission can say that yes, auditors

should do this, and the rest of it has to be left open, left

up for, perhaps, Just a general values, cultural, ethical

principles which pervade in society and left to an individual
auditor, in an individual case acting as a. professional,

because professional has all this in it, to decide for himself.

We may not be able to lay out ground rules covering all of these
values. Maybe if you Just come up with some ground rules on a
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few that we could get a consensus on, that in itself would be a
big step forward.

(GS):

It seems to me, Bob—I’m sorry.

(PR):

I don't know if this is changing the focus

of the discussion, but I was very much interested in the
remark that Bob made about who should define the role of the

auditor.

If I got it down correctly, you said that it shouldn't

be auditors; perhaps auditors might be in on it, but that others
ought to define his role.

Discussion Leader (RE):

Well, what I meant Paul was

that I don't think it is up to auditors to decide that our

function is to improve the level of honesty of business transac

tions in the American economy.

If that is a role of auditors,

I think it should be dictated to us by legislation or by

Judicial means but we auditors shouldn’t sit around saying that
I think it would be nice if business proceeded ethically, so

we are going to take it on ourselves to audit for that.
(PR):

I think that is a very important point, and I

Just wondered how far you would carry it, because we are in the

midst—this Commission—of trying to define the role of the
auditor.

We are also dealing with various other levels, and

there are two aspects that I would like to speak to, if you would

First of all, how far down would you go with it?

We start out
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perhaps at the top with the role of the auditor.

You

can

get down—you used the word function—to what the function
of the auditor should be, what his objectives should be.
Then you come down to what the standards should be, the
accounting/auditing procedures should be, the rules, and so on.
I wondered if there is any use in deciding how far down you

would go before you let the auditor make the judgment. That

is one aspect of it.

The other is, if you believe that

other than auditors ought to get into the definition, at
least, at the top...
Discussion Leader (RE):

They are, through the Cohen

Commission.
(PR):

The Cohen Commission has a limited life.

What

kind of recommendations, for example, should the Cohen Commission

make for a continuance of the proper parties coming together
to help define what the role should be, what the function should

be?
(GS):

Could I react to that, because I think we are

asking the wrong question.

In your cost-benefit framework, there

certain costs and benefits which are appropriately identified
by the profession, by the Cohen Commission.

They are those

dealing with the economic or financial benefits and costs.

The

other costs and benefits which are—or at least benefits—which
are totally inappropriate for the profession and the Cohen
Commission to identify, and those are the ones we are talking
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about in illegal payments, and so on.

It seems to me society

can insist on a compliance audit because society, through its
duly constituted policy agencies, can say that in order to
do interstate business, or in order to be chartered as a

corporation, and in order to do whatnot, you must do certain
things that we think are socially desirable.

(GB):

And when the government has decided that that

is the case, they take care of it.

There is compliance

auditing in taxes, environmental controls...

(GS):

Exactly, that is what I’m trying to say. It

is the responsibility of those agencies that are responsible
for setting these social objectives to insist on compliance

audits in these areas and that this is not an appropriate area

where the profession itself is in a position to identify, or
appropriately identify, cost-benefit relationships.

I think

society on the broader level has to do that.

Now, as far as the other one about the fact that

it is a crime not to report illegal acts, misprison or whatever
its

called, is that true of everybody, or aren’t there some

limitations on that?

Does—is it the duty of everyone to

report?

(CW):

I don’t think there is any such general principle

It is a person involved in active concealment.
Well, therefore I’m saying, prima. facie, there is
is
no such obligation within the law as it/presently constituted,

(GS):

and therefore I think we are dealing with a straw man.
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(EH):

It is probably only a matter of time.

(MFC):

I think that that is right, but George, to

take up your point, what is the situation with respect to

illegal payments that are material, according to conventional
tests?

There is no question about that.

(GS);

(MFC):

Do you mean that there is no question that

the auditor should look for it, or no question that he should
uncover it?

So what we are really talking about is the

nonmaterial payments in conventional terms.

(CW):

From a financial point of view.

(GS):

And that society must establish a compliance

standard, it seems to me, and not the financial recording

profession.
(JR):

Society for what party?

(GS):

The duly constituted authorities that regulate

interstate commerce and regulate the chartering of corporations,

and so on.
(GB):

Let me just say with respect to what George said that

I think it should be considered as a responsibility of the

Commission to speak to that issue about society.

You don’t want

to confuse society with legislators and basically with regulators.
It is not the same thing, and their goals are very often

different.

This isn't to say that democracy is probably not

the best system that we know; it is to say that it has imper
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fections.

So, that as the profession speaks

and talks about the

costs and benefits to other citizens of these kinds of imposi

tions, I think it is important to point these things out.

(GS) :

They may educate but they may not legislate.

(GB):

But I am suggesting that the education aspect

is important to try to communicate to shareholders what

legislators want is not necessarily in their best interest or
in society's best interest.

There is a positive benefit to

legislators to jump on things that look like scandals
say

and to

that we need to have corrective legislation to stop this

pernicious practice.

They hold hearings, get into the headlines,

get re-elected, and the rest of society bears the cost of that
re-election campaign.
(HJ) :

Once in a while they pass laws, too.

Last Friday's

Times reported a bill introduced by Senator Church that would

seem to—very brief article—would seem to imply that the bill
would include requirements for compliance audits on these illegal
and improper payments.

Discussion Leader (RE):
(HJ):

From the way that I read the article, Bob, it was

the independent auditor.

(WN
):

By whom?

Did I read incorrectly?

Let's turn this thing around about determining the

proper role of the auditor.As it has been put here so far it is in
the context that the auditor seems to be sitting here, passively,
waiting for somebody to tell him what his enlarged role is.
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What if Peat Marwick, for example, came out with a new
handy-dandy system for detecting illegal behavior of
corporate executives, and then they go out and sell

companies on the idea of having this additional audit.
Pretty soon all the stockholders say that we want that kind of.
an audit, and whether Peat, Marwick or whoever, everybody has

now got to have one of those audits, because there is some

kind of a market demand for it.

Would that be the proper way

to determine the enlarged role of the auditor in this kind of

area, for example?
Discussion Leader (RE):

question.

That is an interesting

It really gets back to some of the points we made

earlier, that George and some of the others made, about

whether the marketplace, acting without government interference,
would, in fact, do this, or whether they wouldn’t.
think that it is a highly technical question.

I also

But, on the

other hand, I would say the specific example you have come up

with is probably moot, because neither we nor anyone else knows
particularly well how to audit for these things.

Really,

when you look at what the SEC is saying, they are not saying,
at least as I read it, they are not saying that we auditors

have the responsibility to find these things.

What they are

saying is that if we stumble across them, what should we do

about it, and that is a much different question.

(WN
):

-219Yes, but you have had all these directory’

audits, and they found all kinds of little payments.

So,

I think you can audit it.

(MFC);

Those are special costs.

Discussion Leader (RE):

There is a high cost involved

in that.

(RK):

I think the profession’s responsibility here is

to identify the costs, and merely try to lay out to

whatever

level of illegal materiality people might want to get, what would

it cost to get that in the cost of doing all their audits.
There is a tendency on the part of SEC-type agencies to look
at the ones which they know about and think about what it would
have cost to have found that out, given that it occured,

and they know it occured.

Those costs are not very high.

I

think the profession has to say first that the benefits are

here—and I think I got three out of the four that George
indicated. That was not a bad list.

These are the benefits,

but we are not sure how to measure them and we are not sure

where the people are who should be doing the analysis as to how
much these benefits are worth.

Our comparative advantage is

saying, if you want it for whatever reason, here is what it
costs, and cost is an increasing function of the degree of

materiality.

Discussion Leader (RE):

I think the Cohen Commission

must address this question because if they don’t at least talk
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for having ignored the issue. But, given that they talk
it
about/that is a very reasonable thing to say. We don’t

know what people are willing to pay for it, but through our
research we find that if we did this across the whole
economy, looking for payments down to $1,000 would cost

so much.
(RK):

And how many more auditors would you need?

Discussion Leader (RE):

Well, given that we have had

these audits in special cases, we could probably at least
get an order of magnitude estimate of how much it costs to

do these things, and you could project that across all clients.

(DRC):

I'm not worried about that, but that is a little

like where we were with fraud detection when we said that well,
if you want a detailed audit, if you want us to look at every

transaction, we can do that, but the cost is horrendous, and
so one.

But that is not too relevant because no one wanted

to pay for that consistently.

Only when there were circum

stances to indicate that yes, there was a fraud here, and we

were concerned with its magnitude, then yes, we do a detailed

audit.

So, you have the extreme cost, and I recognize that

we can measure that.

But how good do you think the ability

would be to introduce variables into that?

So, raising the

materiality limit and looking for the various small payments
and setting a higher limit, how well can we scale that cost?
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Discussion Leader (RE):

Well, you ask that question,

and we have been talking about comparative advantages all

day.

I would say that even though we couldn’t get a close

measure on that, we can do a better job than anybody else

could of measuring that.

(RK):

Yes, we could do it, because, my understanding is,

you don’t spend a lot of time auditing transactions other than
testing internal control.

sheet type of audit.

You really rely on the balance

I’m not talking about the classification

of certain payments, whether something is an advertising

expense, versus a bribe.
(CW):

Then we do very little of that, very little.

(RK):

That is right, but at least you have an idea

as to how many transactions you have to look at, how many

vouchers or how many payments you have to look at in order to

find a fifty thousand dollar illegal payment.
(DRC):
(LL):

Well, that is not the source of my concern, though

Bob, are you suggesting that the cost would not

be very high?
(RK):

No, I’m saying the cost would be extremely high.

I’m saying that you should be able to estimate them, because

you know how many transactions there are.

I don't know how

many transactions there are at General Electric.
(DRC):

You know how many there are, and you pick them.
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But you have another variable, how deeply do you look at the

ones you pick? And that is going to be, I suspect, a much
more difficult cost to measure.

Discussion Leader (RE):

If a company wants to conceal

these things, we can't find them.
(RK):

And the unrecorded ones are a problem.

(LL):

We had one situation where we quoted a fee and

it was 20% of the year's audit fee.

This was a world-wide

sort of a thing that we wouldn't be doing at all.
20$ of a full year’s fee.

It was

Now, I don't know whether we were

right or not; we weren’t hired to do it.
(RK): But you might say that, if you want us to look

at every payment of $20,000 or more, every expenditure, and

make sure that none of those $20,000 payments, as recorded

on the books, went to illegal campaign contributions, bribes,
or whatever, we could do it, and it would cost you this much,
which is not to say that there would not be some other payments

that had been made that were not recorded. You know, you limit
the scope to what is recorded.

(EH):

The problem, I might point out, is in the use of

the words "and make sure" because the difficulty of deciding,

once one selects the particular transaction, and looks at it
and looks at the support behind it, the problem doesn't get

discussed adequately at a session of this kind, is the difficulty
of deciding whether that particular transaction is one of these.
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(RK):

I think it is incumbent upon the profession to

make these points very clear.

(EH):

I'm trying to, if you would only let me.

And

the risk of misleading ourselves and our clients in this
, very
regard is very substantial.

(LL):

Alright, let’s say that society decided that this

was worth it, that they made that decision, I think we are in
a better position to find it than probably anyone else.

But

that is a big "if," yes.

(EH):

But that isn't a very strong position.

(JR):

But the thing here is an input to society's decision

whether or not to require it is the cost that it would take.

(LL):

measurable.

I think the costs that would be incurred are
I think the benefits that would be derived from

it are another matter.

I think that the society has to make

the decision as to whether they really want it.
DISCUSSION LEADER (RE): The Cohen Commission said to find

these things would approximately triple the audit fees in the U.S.

economy.

That tells legislators something they might use in

deciding whether to require it.
(GB): I would like to raise one other different

question, which I suspect is more important, that the Cohen
Commission might consider.

When I say consider, what I mean is
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(MFC):
(GB):

problems.

I am sorry that we had this meeting today.
One is the difference between ex ante and ex post

As a matter of pointing out, I would like to think

in an educational way, to investors and the general public,

that in advance of a situation, ex ante, they are willing
to take a certain amount of risk.

Everyone does; we cross

the street against the light, and so on.
look around and say:

And ex post, you

"Who can I stick for the loss I took?”

To be the specific, ex ante, I bought New York City tax

anticipation notes at 9 percent.

that is why I got 9 percent.
and I do.

I knew I was taking a risk;

Ex post I want to stick somebody,

It turns out that the accountant" is the first to

get stuck because the corporation, as was pointed out in our

meeting, is bankrupt and the people have run off, and the
accountant is a partnership, and they are the ones to sue.
So, it is a question really of what is the cost to society

of a situation in which you ,are in fact requiring more insurance
—which is what we are really talking about—that people would
be willing to pay for.

The second aspect of that—I Just want to mention

two aspects and I will quit—is the question of the lawyers’

fees and the particular legal situation in the U.S., where if
an accountant is sued and wins, then the only thing that the
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suing attorney loses is his own time and expenses.

Costs are

not assessed, as they are in England, against the unsuccessful
plaintiff, and that gives you a situation in which the value

of lawsuits is greater than you would expect in an unbiased
situation.

I think that might be mentioned.

I think that

is a situation that is going to be worse, because the law school

are spewing forth graduates in enormous numbers whose

opportunity costs and time is very low.

They have nothing to do

They haven't any jobs, and they are going to look around and
say:

’’well, what the hell.

sue an accountant!

Why not?”

It would be good experience to

I think that is a very serious

problem.

(LL):

I have been trying to introduce champerty,

which as I understand is where you sue the lawyer for a

frivolous suit, but Manny just won’t let it get on the agenda.
(GB):

When we talked about benefits, in your cost-

benefit analysis, you left out the benefits to the attorneys.

(RK):

Well, to comment on the first point, we move to

the system where somehow the accountant is there as the insurer
of the people who got stuck with a bankrupt company.

Clearly,

one of the costs would be the difficulty that young and
marginal companies will have in finding auditors.

Again, an

ex ante consequence of the results which say that every time

a company goes bankrupt, we are going to go out and sue the

auditors, is that auditors will start withdrawing from clients
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as they get nearer to marginal conditions, Just the point

where they may need the auditing the most.
(LL):

Well, we will charge an adequate insurance premium

(RK):

To whom, your good customers?

(LL):

The whole works, society.

(RK):

You are still better off avoiding the marginal

customers, given whatever level of insurance premium you charge,

you are going to be better off avoiding the failing company.
(LL):

Well, that is Just pulling out theory.

We were

looking into the audit as an insurance model, as Chuck mentioned

earlier today.

Yes, we actually looked into that.

Discussion Leader (RE):

That wouldn't work.

If he

wanted to charge his clients a bigger fee—his good clients

bigger fees—and I was willing only to audit really top quality
firms, I would offer lower premiums and lower cost, so I would
get his clients away from him.

So, there would be adverse

selection and he would be left with nothing but the dogs.

then he would change his strategy.

So,

It 'is really too complicated

I think.

(RK):

It would still lead to marginal firms having

difficulty finding auditors, certainly newly formed firms.

(MFC):
(CW):

Yes, all of the assigned risks.
All of the retail land companies are going into

the assigned-risk pool.
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(MS):

Or like compensation, the state would do them,

like compensation insurance.
(GB):

One possibility is that this is very similar

to the malpractice insurance problem, of raising the cost of doing

business, of raising the cost of investing in the company.
There is also the other aspect of the SEC.

They are shifting

the bias in the U.S. away from larger companies, in that the
bias against companies is towards the larger companies who are

under the SEC, in terms of all these requirements, as against

companies who are not.

Now, that has some very interesting

aspects in terms of the distribution of income in the country.
One, I know when I was in tax practice, the only cheating I

really saw was among small companies.

The large ones almost

never did cheat; they took advantage of the law, but the real

cheating was the small guys who had a personal ownership stake in
the company and for whom every dollar of cheating went right smack
into his own pocket, as against the accountant working for a large

company who only got a salary.
(MFC):

That doesn’t surprise me, that wasn’t cheating,

that was just an exercise of judgment.
(GB):

That was cheating.

That is why I got out of the

business, frankly, I couldn't take it.

(CW):

The larger companies steal through a different

vehicle, though. They steal through jacking up EPS and selling stock
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Yes, you know and deducting all that kind of

stuff. The other aspect of it, even with the larger companies,

if you look at the maldistribution of income or if that is
a problem then you really want a bias against small businesses,

because large companies tend to be owned by small people
through pension funds and in small shareholdings, while small

businesses tend to be owned by people in the relatively high
end of the income distribution because they are personally owned

And so all of our laws are biased against the poorer elements
in society and in favor of the richer elements.

Not that this

should surprise anyone, but I think it is rather interesting.

(LL):

There are one or two environmental laws that try

to help small business, but that is alright.

(MFC):

I think that on George's last note, there is an

approriate opportunity for me to thank all of you for coming
here today.
things.

I have enjoyed it very much; I have learned some

I did indicate some regret at the very end when you

began to add on the jobs that the Commission must undertake
and fulfill.

(MS):

We will try, with your help.

And on behalf of the Ross Institute, thank you

all for joining us.

It has been a real pleasure.

We hope to

have a publication out based on the tapes of this session in

the reasonably near future.
(MFC):

(MS):

We need that almost immediately, Mike.
We propose to do a little better than the Journal

of Accounting Research.

Thank you very much.

